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On the Sorting of Physicians across Medical Occupations
*
 
We model the sorting of medical students across medical occupations and identify a 
mechanism that explains the possibility of differential productivity across occupations. The 
model combines moral hazard and matching of physicians and occupations with pre-
matching investments. In equilibrium assortative matching takes place; more able physicians 
join occupations less exposed to moral hazard risk, face more powerful performance 
incentives, and are more productive. Under-consumption of health services relative to the 
first best allocation increases with occupational (moral hazard) risk. Occupations with risk 
above a given threshold are not viable. The model offers an explanation for the persistence 
of distortions in the mix of health care services offered, the differential impact of malpractice 
risk across occupations, and the recent growth in medical specialization. 
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The distribution of medical students’ career choice among specialties is the object of
intense debate. It is generally acknowledged, for example, that there is a chronic de￿cit
of service in general medicine and in some specialties such as psychiatry (Brotherton et
al. 2005).1 If wages can freely adjust, as they often do in many countries, how can
such imbalances persist? Another puzzle that has recently received much attention in
the United States is the dramatic growth in specializations. The number of medical
sub-specialties has grown from about 30 in the early 70’s to more than 100 in the late
90’s (Donini-Lenho￿, 2000). This paper develops a theoretical framework that explains
how medical students sort across medical occupations, identi￿es a mechanism that can
explain (a) the possibility of distortions in the supply of health care services across medical
occupations and (b) changes in the extent of specialization, and establishes connections
between these two outcomes.
Our approach assumes that medical occupations compete for talent but di￿er in their
exposure to moral hazard risk. Thus, it is harder to evaluate e￿ort in medical occupations
where decision-making is less grounded in scienti￿c fact and clinical evidence and where
clinical outcomes are uncertain, di￿cult to compare, and rarely repeated. We develop this
point in greater detail in the next section. Each occupation o￿ers a pay-for-performance
contract that trades-o￿ compensation risk and e￿ort incentive, as in the standard moral
hazard model. When medical students select an occupation, they take into account how
their performance will be evaluated and rewarded in their future career, and the associated
risk they will face.
We investigate how di￿erences in moral hazard risk across occupations in￿uence the
matching of occupations and talents, equilibrium contracts, and productivity. To our
knowledge, this is the ￿rst work that considers the possibility that di￿erential exposure
to asymmetric information (moral hazard) across careers can in￿uence career choices and
the incentive to specialize. For the sake of concreteness and relevance, we study the
1Governments and medical organizations sometimes intervene with a variety of incentives and regula-
tions (Thornton and Esposto, 2002).
1market for graduate medical education, but one should keep in mind that many of our
insights apply more broadly to other specialized labor markets.2
Speci￿cally, the model combines moral hazard (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), match-
ing of physicians and medical occupations (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990), and pre-matching
investments (Peters and Siow, 2002). We show that in equilibrium assortative matching
takes place. More able physicians join medical occupations with low moral hazard risk,
face more powerful performance incentives, and are more productive. Even when all
medical occupations are identical ex-ante in terms of marginal productivity of e￿ort, pro-
ductivity is higher in less risky occupations. Two forces drive this result. First, more
able physicians end up in occupations less exposed to moral hazard risk. Second, these
occupations use more powerful incentives and this further magni￿es di￿erences in pro-
ductivity. This second e￿ect is best illustrated in the benchmark case where physicians
are almost identical so that the ￿rst e￿ect has a negligible impact on productivity.
The model identi￿es two channels through which an ine￿cient allocation of physicians
can develop. To begin with, those occupations where risk is too high fail to emerge in
equilibrium because they cannot produce enough surplus to cover outside options. Sec-
ondly, those physicians who accept a position in a high-risk occupation face less powerful
incentives and supply less e￿ort. These two channels imply that ine￿ciencies increase
with occupational risk. In addition, this ine￿ciency di￿erential across occupations in-
creases as the distributions of physician talent and occupational risk are more dispersed.
Since wages can perfectly adjust in the model, there is no shortage in the sense that some
patients cannot ￿nd a physician. The distribution of consumption across occupations,
however, is distorted relative to the ￿rst best one. There is under-consumption of high
risk services. The di￿erential between marginal productivity and marginal cost of e￿ort
increases with occupational risk.
In practice, many factors in￿uence the sorting of physicians across medical occupa-
2Examples include markets for other professionals (e.g. business and law education also o￿er special-
izations), and internal labor markets in large organizations (e.g. the army o￿ers specializations such as
combat, engineering, and intelligence and banks o￿er careers in sales, trading, and corporate ￿nance).
These specialized labor markets share in common the features that workers make speci￿c human capital
investments and commit to a career, while employers compete for workers with career promises.
2tions. For example, lifestyle and work schedule have been shown to in￿uence career choice
(Landon et al. 2003a). Some of these factors also explain why the relative demand for
some occupations can change over time. As long as wages can adjust, however, the factors
that have been identi￿ed in the literature do not give rise to ine￿ciencies and should not
raise concerns among policy-makers. Alternatively, some specialties may arti￿cially re-
strict entry (Le￿er, 1978), but this cannot explain the excess residency positions in some
specialties. Finally, sub-optimal matching institutions may lead to ine￿ciencies, but it is
not clear why systematic di￿erentials across specialties should develop (Roth, 2008). Our
contribution is to show that asymmetric information can generate systematic distortions
in the distribution of health care supply across specialties.
After presenting the main results, we discuss several implications. The analysis sug-
gests an explanation for the reduced enrollment in generalist career relative to specialist
ones. Assume that moral hazard risk has decreased in specialty careers relative to gener-
alist ones. This is consistent with evidence presented in DeWitt et al (1998), and could be
due, for example, to a di￿erential increase in the role of scienti￿c measurement in many
specialties. The implication is that specialty careers would become more attractive.
In addition, we argue that the model can help explain the growth in specialization
over the past decades. The analysis shows that low-risk sub-specialities have an incentive
to branch out from their main ￿eld. By doing so, they can attract better physicians
and increase productivity. The model also sheds some light on the impact of malpractice
reform on the distribution of physicians across specialties and across states (Kessler et
al, 2005). Finally, an increased emphasis on performance measurement or on ￿nancial
incentives, due to pressure from consumer advocate groups, health insurers or policy-
makers as has happened in recent years, is likely to exacerbate the relative shortage of
talent across medical occupations. Our analysis suggests that such reform should be
implemented across-the-board to internalize externalities across specialties, instead of
specialty-by-specialty, as currently done.
The incentive literature has studied performance measurement at the ￿rm level (see
Prendergast 1999 for a review) and many studies have investigated empirically the canon-
ical proposition that incentive power should decrease with performance risk (Prendergast,
32002). Little attention has been dedicated to the study of broader implications of moral
hazard at a more macro level, across occupations or within a specialized labor market,
as we do in this paper. In particular, there is to our knowledge no work investigating
the possibility that moral hazard may lead to a failure to organize an economic activity.3
Our central assumption that heterogeneity in the exposure to moral hazard risk may in-
￿uence matching, plays an important role in the empirical literature studying the relation
between incentives and performance risk (Chiappori and Salanie, 2003). While the em-
pirical literature has focused on single occupations and considered only matching on risk
aversion on the worker side (Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002), we consider di￿erentiated
occupations and study matching over worker talent.
Our model borrows two important ideas from the literature on organizational design.
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994) have shown the importance of interactions between
di￿erent inputs of production and incentive instruments within a ￿rm. Likewise, our
model makes extensive use of complementarity, not only within production units as in
the past literature, but also across units through assortative matching as in Besley and
Ghatak (2005). Technically, the model is similar to Serfes (2005, forthcoming) who embeds
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) within a matching setup, but he does so to capture the
possibility of endogenous matching on risk aversion as suggested by the evidence from
Ackerberg and Botticini (2002). In contrast with our model which assumes heterogeneity
in talent, heterogeneity in risk aversion is not su￿cient in general to guarantee assortative
matching. There is much evidence supporting our assumption that talent determines
sorting (e.g. Kiker and Zeh (1998) show that performance in medical school in￿uences
the choice of specialty).
The next section provides some background discussion on the market for physicians.
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 derives the main results on sorting, productivity,
and pay incentives. Section 5 discusses some implications and Section 6 concludes.
3The early transaction cost literature has explored the role of performance measurement in the or-
ganization of production (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) but the focus of this literature is on the role of
information cost in explaining the existence of ￿rms.
42 Medical Occupations, Career Choice, and Moral
Hazard
About one-third of physicians are primary care doctors. There are specialties within
primary care such as pediatrics. When patients’ speci￿c health needs require further
treatment, primary care physicians send them to see a specialist. Specialist physicians
di￿er from primary care ones in that they focus on treating a particular system or part
of the body, such as neurologists who study the brain. In the United States, there are
about 30 medical specialties and 100 subspecialities. Di￿erent organizations are involved
in controlling quality through accreditation of programs, certi￿cation and disciplining of
physicians (specialty boards), and licensure (government).
Career Choice
The issue of matching physicians’ choice of medical career with medical need is often
debated and even more so when shortages become salient (Thornton and Esposto, 2002).
Enrolment across careers displays cycles in addition to long term trends (Dorsey et al.
2003). For example, there has been a steady decline in the ratio of generalists to specialists
over the past decade. Both the government and medical societies intervene, through
funding priorities, subsidized loan programs, educational reforms, and regulated work
schedules to name just a few examples, to correct trends that could have a negative
impact on the ability to provide, in the long-term, a balanced specialty mix of medical
care. For example, in 1993 and 1994, the Physician Payment Review Commission advised
Congress to implement a system of quantitative restrictions on positions.
There is a large literature studying the choice of medical specialty both in medicine
(e.g. Weeks and Wallace, 2002) and economics (Nicholson, 2002). Medical students have
discretion over the choice of medical specialization. For example, Bland and Isaacs (2002)
report that more than 40 percent of students select a specialty during or after their third
year of medical school, and between 40 and 60 percent of medical students change their
minds at least once. A large body of research has shown that demographic characteristics
in￿uence career choice. In addition, there is also much evidence that economic incen-
tives matter. Among other considerations, perceived future earnings, educational debt,
5expected lifestyle (work schedule and predictability of hours), and malpractice risk, have
been shown to in￿uence the choice of specialty.
Under the assumption that compensation can adjust, the fact that physicians have
preferences over specialties cannot explain the existence of di￿erential ine￿ciencies across
careers. To single out the driving force in our mechanism for ine￿ciencies, the model will
assume that all medical occupations are identical in all respects except in their exposure
to moral hazard, and that physicians select a medical occupation only on the basis of
expected future utility.
Health Care, Moral Hazard and Pay for Performance
The model assumes that moral hazard prevails in medicine. This is consistent with
the view that physicians’ output is notoriously di￿cult to measure. For example, Arrow’s
(1963) seminal analysis of medical care recognized that ‘uncertainty as to the quality
of the product is perhaps more intense here than in any other important commodity.’
That physicians are providing di￿erent levels of care is well documented (Committee on
Quality Health Care in America, 2001). Perceptions of quality are formed by experience,
physician and hospital ratings (such as report cards, Dranove et al., 2002; and U.S.
News and World Report rankings), peer assessments of physicians (the advice of a family
doctor), reputation, word-of-mouth, disciplining boards, and so on. These perceptions
drive up or down the demand for particular physicians.4
The model also assumes that employers can reduce moral hazard by introducing perfor-
mance incentives but they have to strike a balance between incentives and risk exposure.
Again, there is much evidence consistent with this view. For example, Gaynor and Gertler
(1999) show that compensation methods respond to the riskiness of the environment, as
we assume in the model, in addition to the more basic issue that performance incentives
have a substantial e￿ect on physicians’ e￿ort. Many performance measures are used in
practice, such as the number of patients treated, billed hours, clinical outcomes, report
cards, adherence to clinical guidelines, patient surveys, peer evaluations, to name just a
4More recently, a number of private ￿rms and public organizations (e.g. National Committee for Qual-
ity Assurance, HealthGrades) have started to compile information on individual physicians’ performance
and are making it available over the Internet. One would expect ratings to in￿uence decisions by patients
and managed care organizations, and therefore physician demand.
6few examples. There are several ways through which physician compensation is linked to
performance. For example, fee-for-service and capitation contracts play a signi￿cant role
under managed care (Gold, 1999), revenue sharing is common in partnerships (Gaynor
and Gertler, 1999), and academic hospitals use measures of clinical work and academic
standing to determine pay (Abouleish et al. 2005).
Heterogeneity across Medical Occupations
The departing point of the model is that the exposure to moral hazard varies across
medical occupations. To ￿x ideas, we discuss di￿erent sources of heterogeneity that are
consistent with this view. There is much agreement that the ability to assess the quality
of physicians’ decision-making varies across treatment areas. For example, outsiders can
observe whether a mammography or childhood immunization was prescribed for a woman
or child who falls within the guidelines of recommended practice, or whether a ￿-blocker
was administered to a patient after a myocardial infarction. In the treatment of complex
illnesses, however, performance is more di￿cult to evaluate. For example, Angell and
Kassirer (1996, p. 884) motivate this challenge by commenting that \treating congestive
heart failure or urosepsis in a patient with diabetes mellitus, who may have other medical
problems as well, involves not only a complex series of decisions and interactions, but also
the nearly imponderable element of individual variation." In such cases, e￿ort is likely
impossible to evaluate on a case by case basis.
More generally, the information available on outcomes of care and clinical processes de-
pends on the medical occupation.5 Some clinical treatments have only a statistical impact
while others have a deterministic one and the lag between action and e￿ect varies greatly
across treatments. For example, those specialists who repeatedly practice only a few,
possibly highly complex, procedures are less subject to performance risk. This is known
as the sample size e￿ect and Landon et al (2003b, p. 1197) note that the \sample size
problem is less di￿cult in certain specialties, like cardiac surgery and interventional cardi-
5Loeb (2004) reports that \not all decision-making in medicine is grounded in scienti￿c fact and clinical
evidence (i.e. opinion plays a signi￿cant role in medical decision-making). While evidence-based clinical
practice guidelines exist in a variety of specialities and subspecialities in medicine, consistent evidence
suggests that adherence to guidelines is poor."
7ology, in which physicians may perform a large number of a limited range of procedures."6
Taking into account this e￿ect as well as many other considerations, they conclude that
the ability to measure clinical performance varies across medical occupations.7 Consis-
tent with this view, a subcommittee hearing on measuring physician quality reports that
\it does depend very much on the specialties. There is a very wide range of specialties
and conditions for which administrative data{in particular when we include laboratory
results and pharmacy{can provide a very solid picture of physician performance{not in
all specialties."8;9
Taken together, the evidence is consistent with our main assumption that there exist
systematic di￿erences across medical occupations in the quality of information available to
assess physician performance, and therefore di￿erences in occupational exposure to moral
hazard. To reduce the number of actors in the analysis, the model assumes that a single
employer hires a single physician in each medical occupation. Adding competition between
employers and physicians within a medical occupation, as is the case, for example, when
di￿erent radiology departments compete for radiologists, would not change the analysis.
In addition, we assume that di￿erent medical occupations can o￿er di￿erent incentive
6To illustrate, consider the problem of evaluating a neurosurgeon’s removal of a nerve root tumor, a
tumor that develops from the cells of the nerve or of its lining near the point it exits the spinal canal.
The outcome|the degree to which pain and numbness are reduced and whether permanent paralysis
results|depends not only on the skill, dexterity, and care of the surgeon, but also on chance. It depends
on chance because the surgeon has little in￿uence over the size, location, and degree of separation between
the tumor and nerve tissue but these things in￿uence the surgical outcome. In specialized practices where
this procedure is performed frequently, the noise averages out, and the quality of e￿ort is more easily
discerned. In more general practices (say in less urban areas) where the surgeon is treating a variety of
conditions her performance will be noisier.
7\Few medical specialties have an evidence base that is robust and comprehensive enough to support
physician clinical performance assessment. Some specialties such as cardiology and endocrinology have
some evidence-based process measure that have been de￿nitely linked to improved patient outcomes.
Other specialties such as cardiac surgery, have outcomes that have been studied, such as mortality in
coronary artery bypass grafting. Outcome measures for other specialties, however, occur too infrequently
or tool long after care to make their collection feasible."
8Hearing on Measuring Physician Quality and E￿ciency of Care for Medicare Bene￿ciaries.
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=390
9For example, patient management plays an important role in medical care but the associated skills are
very di￿cult to measure. One aspect considered in the medical literature corresponds to empathy. Many
experts believe that empathy, de￿ned as understanding the \patient’s inner experiences and perspective
and communicating this understanding", in￿uences clinical outcomes (Hojat et al. 2002). The importance
of empathy, however, varies across specialties, being more important in the \people-oriented" specialties
(such as psychiatry, pediatrics or family practice) as compared to the technically-oriented disciplines
(such as surgery or anesthesiology).
8contracts. This captures the fact that the hospital or health organization where physicians
work, can treat di￿erently physicians in di￿erent occupations.
3 Model
The objective of the model is to identify a mechanism that can generate di￿erential
ine￿ciencies across medical occupations and also to reveal the factors that cause this
di￿erential. To achieve this goal, we selectively include in the model the features that can
generate such an e￿ect or magnify it. Because these features are not necessarily present
simultaneously, the distortions observed in practice may not be as dramatic as those that
the model can explain.
There are three building blocks to the model: pre-matching investments, matching,
and moral hazard. The moral hazard part uses functional forms that are standard in the
incentive literature and justi￿ed in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Following the assor-
tative matching literature, we model matching using unidimensional preference ordering.
A more realistic model would acknowledge the fact that matching takes place along other
dimensions but this would not change the nature of the results.
The model has physicians and employers (hospitals, health maintenance organizations,
partnerships). To simplify the exposition in the core of the analysis, we assume without
loss of generality, that each employer represents a medical occupation, and as such, is
endowed with a distinct technology to control moral hazard risk. (When we discuss the
issue of specialization we will consider a sightly di￿erent interpretation of the model.)
There are three periods (see Figure 1). In period one, physicians invest in human capital
and employers invest to reduce exposure to moral hazard risk. At the end of period one,
the distribution of human capital amongst physicians and moral hazard risk amongst
occupations are observed. In the second period, physicians and employers match and agree
on a contract. In the third period, physicians exert e￿ort, nature draws performance, and
contracts are executed.
There is a continuum of physicians indexed by ￿ 2 R = [￿0;￿1]. Physician type ￿
is distributed with density f > 0 and continuous distribution F. Investment in human
9capital lowers the cost of e￿ort. All results follow if we assume instead that it increases
productivity of e￿ort and we will further discuss the issue after presenting the results. A
physician with cost of e￿ort c gets disutility C(ejc) ￿ 0 for exerting e￿ort e ￿ 0 where
Ce > 0, Cee > 0, Cc > 0, and Cce > 0. Physician of type ￿ achieves cost index c ￿ 0 if
she invests H(cj￿) ￿ 0 where Hc < 0, Hcc > 0, H￿ < 0, H￿c > 0, and H = 0 for c large
enough. The utility of a physician of type ￿ who selects cost of e￿ort c, exerts e￿orts e,
and is paid wage w is
U
3;P(e;c;wj￿) = ￿exp[￿r(w ￿ C(ejc) ￿ H(cj￿))]
where superscripts denote the period and agent considered, and r is the coe￿cient of
absolute risk aversion. There is a continuum of employers (or medical occupations),
indexed by ￿, which are taken as given. ￿ is distributed according to density g > 0
and continuous distribution G with support ￿ = [￿0;￿1]. Work e￿ort is subject to moral
hazard. Employers, however, can reduce exposure to moral hazard. Employer ￿ can
achieve moral hazard risk s ￿ 0 at cost K(sj￿) ￿ 0 where Ks < 0, Kss > 0, K￿ < 0,
Ks￿ > 0, and K = 0 for s large enough.10 Each employer receives an imperfect measure
of e￿ort according to
m(e;s) = e + "s
where "s is an error term that is distributed normally with mean zero and variance s2.
The measurement errors are independently drawn across employers.
In period two, physicians and employers decide whether to match, and conditional on
matching, agree on a contract. Following the literature, we restrict to linear compensation
schedule b = (b0;b1)
w(m) = b0 + b1m:
The physician then chooses e￿ort level e and nature draws performance outcome m.
Finally, the employer rewards the physician according to the agreed rule w(m). We ￿rst
assume that all employers equally value ￿(e) > 0 e￿ort level e such that ￿0 > 0 and
10Investments to reduce moral hazard risk should be interpreted broadly. It could capture the invest-
ment made by the hospital hiring the physician. Alternatively, it could also be interpreted as medical
societies investing in monitoring quality through re-licensure, and disciplining.
10￿00 < 0. We later discuss the case of heterogeneous productivity across occupations.
Employers are risk neutral and maximize ￿(e) ￿ Ew(m) ￿ K(sj￿), or
U
3;S(e;sj￿) = ￿(e) ￿ b1e ￿ b0 ￿ K(sj￿):
We focus on stable matching (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). We denote ￿2;S(c) the employer
matched with physician c if physician c is matched and ￿2;S(c) = ; otherwise. For ease
of exposition, we similarly de￿ne ￿2;P(s) and we have ￿2;P(￿2;S(c)) = c for matched
pairs. The equilibrium contract function associates a contract B(c) = (b0(c);b1(c)) to
each matched pair. The outside options of employers and physicians are U0;S and U0;P
respectively. In stage two, we denote u2;S(s) the expected payo￿ of employer s and u2;P(c)
the certainty equivalent continuation payo￿ of physician c.11 Following Peters and Siow
(2002), we de￿ne a rational expectation equilibrium as:
(1) A set of investment rules c(￿) and s(￿) for physicians and employers that maximize
their payo￿s conditional on expectations about u2;P() and u2;S().
(2) The matching and contract functions ￿2;S(c) and B(c) are stable. In period two,
(a) no pair of physician and employer (c;s) such that ￿2;S(c) 6= s wants to match under
any contract, (b) no pair of physician and employer (c;s) such that ￿2;S(c) = s wants to
change contract.
(3) Period one participation says that no matched physician or employer prefers the
outside option over the equilibrium payo￿.
(4) An incentive compatible level of e￿ort e(c) for each matched physician.
(5) Physicians and employers have rational expectations: the functions u2;P() and
u2;S() are consistent with ￿2;S(c), B(c), and e(c).
The functions u2;P() and u2;S() correspond to the market return of investments. As in
Peters and Siow (2002), physicians and employers choose optimal investments given their
expectations about the market returns. The main di￿erence is that utility is transferable in
our model so the functions u2;P() and u2;S() do not depend only on equilibrium matching,
11c is indi￿erent between receiving u2;P(c) for sure and matching with ￿2;S(c) under contract B(c). As
will become clear soon, CARA utility implies that the certainty equivalent does not depend on physician
type ￿.
11as would be the case under non-transferable utilities, but also depend on the equilibrium
sharing rule.
Our objective is to derive equilibrium cross variations in (c(￿);s(￿);￿2;S(c);e(c);B(c)).
The main innovations of the model is to capture the fact that exposure to moral hazard
varies across employers and to allow for matching. For the sake of generality, we have
introduced the possibility of pre-matching investments by employers, and this addresses
the concern that exposure to moral hazard is to some extent endogenous. We also con-
sider pre-matching investment by physicians to capture the e￿ort supplied during medical
school training, but this feature of the model is not essential.
In addition to boundary conditions, two technical conditions are su￿cient to demon-
strate equilibrium uniqueness.12
Assumption 1: (A1a) C2
ee + CeCeee > 0, (A1b) Cece > Ceee:
This assumption holds, for example, for quadratic cost C(ejc) = ce2
2 . Following Holm-
strom and Milgrom (1991, p.179), we de￿ne W 2;SB(c;s) = Maxe
n
￿(e) ￿ C(ejc) ￿ r
2(sCe(ejc))2
o
the period two information constrained surplus function of pair (c;s) in certainty equiv-
alent monetary units.13 A1b is su￿cient to show that e￿ort and moral hazard risk are
complement in the joint surplus function.
Assumption 2: (A2a) Hcc > Wcc, Kss > W 2;SB






Assumptions A2 guaranty that the pre-matching investments are monotone in type.
4 Analysis
We derive the main qualitative results in the context of the general model. To discuss
additional implications, we consider a restricted version of the model where it is possible
to derive closed form solutions. We assume no pre-matching investments ￿ = c and ￿ = s
12Ce(0jc) = 0, Ce(1jc) = 1, Ks(0;￿) = ￿1, Ks(1;￿) = 0, Hc(0;￿) = ￿1, Hc(1;￿) = 0, and
Cc(0jc) bounded.
13This is the sum of the specialty pro￿t and physician certainty equivalent. The meaning of this
expression will become clear after Lemma 1.
12and functional forms C(ejc) = ce2
2 and ￿(e) = ￿e. The reader who perfers to start with
an example should read section 4.3 ￿rst. All proofs are presented in the appendix.
4.1 Symmetric Information
As a benchmark, consider the case where e￿ort is perfectly observable (no moral hazard).
Employers do not invest to reduce s (K = 0) and sorting is arbitrary. Since employers are
identical, they receive the same payo￿, which is determined such that both sides of the
market are willing to participate, and physicians receive the residual surplus. Physician
of type ￿ chooses c(￿) and e(￿) such that, Hc(cj￿) + Cc(ejc) = 0 and Ce(ejc) = ￿e(e)
independently of the employer she is matched with.
In the application with no pre-matching investments (H = 0) and quadratic cost of





The period two surplus under the symmetric information W 2;FB(c;s) = Maxe f￿(e) ￿ C(ejc)g






Employers do not to invest to reduce moral hazard risk, s. Surplus increases in talent
and is independent of employer risk. Medical occupations are completely undi￿erentiated.
Under symmetric information, the model does not say anything about specialization. We
will return to the issue when we discuss the incentives to specialize under asymmetric
information.
4.2 Asymmetric Information
We analyze the problem backward. Consider a physician of type c who has matched in
period two with employer s and agreed to contract (b0;b1). In period three, the physician
sets e to maximize b1e ￿ C(ejc). The period three e￿ort e(c;b1) solves
Ce(ejc) = b1 (1)
13We can now characterize the incentive component of the period two contract.





Lemma 1 says that any incentive contract that does not maximize the information
constrained joint surplus of pair (c;s) cannot be part of an equilibrium. If this would
be the case, pair (c;s) could renegotiate, agree on a contract with incentive parameter
b1(c;s), and set a transfer payment b0(c;s) that makes both parties better o￿.
The role of CARA utility is now transparent. As in the standard principal agent model,
CARA utility implies that the sharing rule b1(c;s) does not depend on the ￿xed transfer
b0(c;s) and this makes the contract design problem separable in these two dimensions. In
addition, CARA implies that the sharing rule is independent of the level of pre-matching
investments H(cj￿). We get inter-temporal separability; we can solve for matching and
contracting in stage two independently of the stage one pre-matching investment choices.
The de￿nition of W 2;SB(c;s) becomes clear. In period two, physician c and occupation
s agree on contract b1(c;s) and the certainty equivalent continuation payo￿ is W 2;SB(c;s).
This corresponds to the maximum payo￿ (in certainty equivalent units) that the pair can
achieve under incentive compatibility.
We now turn to the matching problem. Stability requires W 2;SB(c;s) = u2;P(c) +
u2;S(s). For the sake of exposition, we initially assume that all physicians and occupations




= U0;S = 0. Matching is
positive assortative (PAM) in period two if ￿2;S(c) is increasing and similarly in period
one if higher ￿ match with higher ￿. We can now state our main result.
Lemma 2: In any equilibrium, there is PAM in (c;s) in period two and in (￿;￿) in period
one. Types (￿;￿) such that G(￿) = F(￿) match together.
Two forces drive the PAM result. First, the physician cost of e￿ort and occupational
risk are complement in the joint surplus function W 2;SB(c;s). This alone implies PAM
14in (c;s) in period two. Second, investments that lower the cost of e￿ort and the level of
risk are complement with types H￿c > 0 and K￿s > 0. Combined with PAM in period
two, this implies PAM also in period one. Clearly, the assumption of complementarity
between investment and type characterizes the situation where pre-matching investments
increases the amount of heterogeneity in (c;s) relative to the no-investment benchmark.
Without complementarity, pre-matching investments may maintain or even reduce the
initial heterogeneity in (c;s). Still, for any distribution of (c;s) Lemma 2 shows that
there is assortative matching in period two and this is what drives our main results on
e￿ciency di￿erential across occupations, as we will see soon. The main point is that
the analysis is robust to pre-matching investments and the results are magni￿ed under
complementarity.
The outcome of sorting rests on the assumptions we made on the nature of hetero-
geneity amongst workers and occupations. Sorting is governed by the interaction between
worker and occupation type in the joint surplus function. Workers may di￿er in other
dimensions than ability and occupations may di￿er in other dimensions than risk. For
example, Serfes (2005) assumes that workers di￿er in their degree of risk aversion r (he
assumes that employers di￿er in riskiness s as we do in this paper) and shows that it is
possible to characterize the equilibrium only in speci￿c cases.14 In contrast, we consider
matching between worker ability and occupational risk. Since c and s are complement in
W 2;SB only PAM can occur.15
More generally, we could have assumed that worker ability is captured by their mar-
ginal productivity instead of marginal cost of e￿ort. All results would follow if physicians
would have identical cost function but would di￿er in term of marginal productivity
(worker of type ￿ produces ￿(e) = ￿e). A central assumption is that worker ability is
14When risk plays a small (large) role in the sense that rs2 is small (large) for the highest (lowest)
types, then r and s are complement (substitute) in W2;SB and PAM (Negative AM) holds. He cannot
characterize the equilibrium for intermediate ranges of rs2.
15Our analysis sheds new light on the debate on the tenous link between risk and incentives (Pren-
dergast, 2002). While the literature has exclusively focused on unobserved heterogenity in risk-aversion
(Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), Serfes (2005)), our model shows that unobserved heterogeneity on worker
ability also matters. Since ability is negatively associated with risk and positively with incentives, ig-
noring such heterogeneity introduces a bias toward over-estimating of the negative relationship between
risk and incentives.
15independent of occupational risk. The analysis may change if one assumes that part of
the risk can be controlled by the worker. For example, the equilibrium matching may
di￿er if more able workers can control risk more e￿ciently. The model, therefore, applies
primarily to sources of risks that are outside the control of physicians. We can now state
our main proposition.
Proposition 1: There exists a unique equilibrium up to the ￿xed constant b0(c(￿0)).




contracting is de￿ned by (2), e￿orts by (1), and investments by
(






Equations (3) and (4) de￿ne the matching function and pre-matching investment func-
tions. The sharing rule is de￿ned by (2). The stability conditions de￿ne the period
two continuation payo￿s (up to a constant) according to u2;P
c (c) = W 2;SB
c (c;￿2;S(c)) and
u2;S
s (s) = W 2;SB
s (￿2;P(s);s) and the constant is determined by the allocation of surplus
between the lowest pair b0(c(￿0)) which can take any value so long as the participation
constraints are satis￿ed. The resulting u2;P(c) and u2;S(s) determine the ￿xed transfers
for higher pairs.
In equilibrium, higher ability workers acquire lower costs of e￿ort, and higher type
occupations invest more to lower exposure to moral hazard. Higher ability physicians
work in occupations that have more precise measurement, face stronger incentives, and
supply more e￿ort. Productivity increases with type. Because of the complementarity
between physicians and occupations, a given increase in physician quality is magni￿ed so
that joint surplus increases by a disproportional factor (dW2;SB




The distribution of earnings across occupations depends on the distribution of ability c, as
one would expect, but also on the distribution of measurement risk s. Earning inequalities
across occupations increase when there is more heterogeneity in performance risk across
occupations.
16E￿ciency
We now turn to the main implications of the model. Firstly, there is a shortage
of e￿ort in all occupations relative to the ￿rst best level of e￿ort, because the e￿ective
marginal cost of e￿ort, Ce(1+rs2Cee), includes a risk premium due to moral hazard. Most
importantly, this shortage of e￿ort increases with occupational risk. As a result, the ratio
between marginal productivity and marginal cost of e￿ort, a measure of occupational











Di￿erences in moral hazard across occupations generates di￿erences in producticvity.
Secondly, some occupations may have to shut down in equilibrium. Participation in
the above equilibrium is warranted as long as the surplus of the lowest types is su￿cient
to cover their reservation utilities
W








= V 0;S = 0. To further explore





















All physicians such that ￿ < ￿￿ and occupations such that ￿ < G￿1(F(￿￿)) = ￿￿ prefer
the outside option. Total employment, de￿ned as the mass of employed physicians, 1 ￿
F(￿￿), increases with an improvement in moral hazard technology. Employers with high
moral hazard risk have to shut down in equilibrium despite the fact that the marginal
productivity of e￿ort is the same in these occupations and in those occupations that do
not shut down. The viability of a medical occupation depends on its exposure to moral
hazard. The main message of the model is to show that occupations subject to high moral
hazard risk will face more di￿culties attracting talented physicians.
Thirdly, the only source of ine￿ciency is due to moral hazard. There do not exist
alternative matches or investments that would make any pair better o￿. In particular,
physicians and occupations do not over-invest to improve their match opportunities.
17Proposition 2: The equilibrium allocation is constrained Pareto e￿cient.
The ￿nding that pre-matching investments are constrained e￿cient extends the analy-
sis of Peters and Siow (2002) to transferable utilities. In our model, the market return
functions do not depend only on the matching function, ￿2;:(:), as would be the case under
non-transferable utilities. They also depend on the equilibrium sharing rule. The combi-
nation of the equilibrium sharing rules and matching functions give bilaterally e￿cient in-
vestment incentives in period one (u2;P
c (c) = W 2
c (c;￿2;S(c)) and u2;S
s (s) = W 2
s (￿2;P(s);s)).
Although the model was presented in the context of a decentralized labor market, all re-
sults follow in applications to internal labor markets (e.g. army, professional ￿rms) since
Proposition 2 shows that there is no coordination externality.
Forth and ￿nally, the model implies that high talent physicians concentrate in low risk
occupations. This does not introduce any distortion relative to the ￿rst best allocation,
because the sorting of medical occupations and physicians is arbitrary in the absence of
moral hazard. But consider an extension of the current model where it is e￿cient to
allocate talent evenly across medical occupations, for example, because of complementar-
ity between di￿erent talent levels as in Saint-Paul (2001). The presence of moral hazard
would introduce a force that attracts high talent physicians to low risk occupations. This
suggests that the equilibrium allocation of talent would be distorted relative to the ￿rst
best allocation. Although the argument is informal, the model identi￿es a force that could
create a shortage of talent in high risk occupations.
Growth in Specialization
Medical practices with low exposure to moral hazard have an incentive to branch out
into independent occupation since by doing so they can attract better physicians and
increase joint-surplus. The current model, however, does deliver this prediction because
the set of occupations ￿ is ￿xed by assumption. To make progress, we propose a slightly
modi￿ed interpretation of the model. Assume that the index ￿ denotes a medical ￿eld
instead of a medical occupation. The set of medical ￿elds, ￿, is given and we are interested
in how these ￿elds are pooled into medical occupations, where a medical occupation is
a set of ￿elds that share the same moral hazard risk. This is a contractual de￿nition
18of occupation and a measure of contractual specialization is ￿ = s(￿0) ￿ s(￿1). In the
benchmark case where all medical ￿elds face the same exposure to moral hazard (s(￿)
is constant across ￿), this measure says that there is no specialization, ￿ = 0, which is
correct since physicians are indi￿erent between medical ￿elds. For ￿ > 0, each physician
covers only a subset of ￿elds. Specialization increases with ￿.
Under symmetric information, there is no contractual specialization in the sense de-
￿ned above since medical ￿elds are undi￿erentiated. Under asymmetric information,
however, medical ￿elds get bundled into occupations with identical s. Contractual spe-
cialization depends on how exposure to moral hazard varies across ￿elds. To illustrate
the possibility of growth in specialization, assume that the moral hazard technology K
depends on a shifter denoted by a that captures, for example, developments in scienti￿c
technology (e.g. ecography, endoscopy). We have K(s;￿;a) where Ka ￿ 0. De￿ne ￿0
as primary care ￿elds and ￿1 as narrower medical ￿elds and assume furthermore that
scienti￿c technology has an impact only in narrow ￿elds, Ka(s;￿0;a) = 0. With new
developments in scienti￿c technology, s(￿0) remains constant while s(￿1) decreases. As a
result, ￿ increases and this can be interpreted as an increase in specialization. Growth in
specialization is driven by a di￿erential change in the ability to control exposure to moral
hazard across ￿elds.
4.3 Example and Discussion
Closed form solutions can be obtained in the case without pre-matching investments.















All three functions decrease with type. E￿ort and surplus are lower than under the ￿rst
best allocation.
19The main point of the model is to establish the possibility of di￿erential ine￿ciency
across occupations and also of magni￿cation of these ine￿ciencies through complementar-
ity in matching. To clarify this point, we consider three di￿erent scenarios. (1) Assume no
moral hazard, and occupations vary in their marginal productivity of e￿ort, ￿(e) = ￿e,
where ￿ captures the occupation’s type. Then talent varies across occupations, because
of PAM along (c;￿), but there is no ine￿ciency. (2) Introduce moral hazard and assume
no heterogeneity across physicians, and occupations again vary in ￿. Ine￿ciencies are
constant across occupations up to the scale factor ￿. These ￿rst two scenarios show that
matching alone and moral hazard alone do not generate di￿erential ine￿ciencies across
occupations. (3) In the case considered in the model, with matching on (c;s) and moral
hazard (the same applies to matching over (￿;s)), ine￿ciencies vary across occupations
for two reasons. Risk varies across occupations and this is furthermore ampli￿ed by the
complementarity between talent and risk and the endogenous adjustment of incentives
across occupations.
Surplus decreases with type for three reasons: low talent physicians are less productive,
work in riskier occupations, and face weaker incentives. Considering the benchmark case
with almost no physician heterogeneity makes this point clear. Assume that the support
of physician type is [c0;c0 + "] where " is a small positive number so that physicians
are almost identical. The ￿rst best e￿ort level is almost constant, close to ￿
c, while the
equilibrium e￿ort level decreases as s spans the interval [s0;s1]. As a result, productivity
decreases with type.
Although there exist ine￿ciencies in all occupations (as long as s0 > 0), the model
focuses on relative ine￿ciencies across occupations. The ratio of the highest to lowest















Distortions relative to the ￿rst best allocation are large when s and/or c, and therefore
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￿2;P(s) measures the percentage change in risk for a one percent change
in physician talent and ￿ = b1
￿ 2 [0;1] corresponds to the normalized sharing rule. The
ampli￿cation e￿ect can be large. In fact, "W2;SB
s < ￿2[1 + "c
s] < ￿2 and a one percent
increase in measurement risk implies at least a two percent reduction in surplus. When




A ￿nal point on compensation variability is worth mentioning. Paradoxically, compen-
sation risk does not always increase with occupational risk. The variance of compensation
is





A su￿cient condition for compensation risk to decrease with occupational risk is r￿2;P(s)s2 <
1 which is equivalent to b1(￿2;P(s)) < ￿
2. When the incentive schemes are low powered
(the physician gets a share lower than ￿fty percent), more talented physicians will earn
less variable compensation, despite the fact that they face more powerful incentives. This
is because they work in less risky occupations. In general, the covariation between occu-
pational risk and pay variability depends on the strength of these countervailing e￿ects.
This suggests that one has to be careful measuring risk empirically. Pay variability cannot
be used as a proxy for occupational risk.
5 Implications
As mentioned in the introduction, many considerations in￿uence the sorting of physicians
and medical occupations. The model, however, focuses exclusively on moral hazard risk.
The proper use of the model, therefore, is to consider situations where moral hazard
risk varies over time, space, or similar occupations, and to study the impact on sorting,
holding other considerations constant. We present three applications along these lines.
In addition, the model can be used to formulate normative assessments of policy. To
illustrate, we discuss implications of the recent debate on performance measurement.
21Generalist versus Specialist Careers
In recent years, medical students tend to favour specialist occupations over being a
generalist. Among the factors that in￿uence this decision, DeWitt et al. (1998) report
that \subjects cited the ability in specialty practice to have problems ‘well-framed,’ to
‘be the expert,’ and to gain mastery over a smaller core of knowledge, as well as the
uncertainty inherent in general medicine. Many expressed variations of one physician’s
opinion that, ‘It’s easier to be a specialist because there’s a smaller area of expertise and
one can happily and guiltlessly ignore all other problems’." The model can explain the
recent imbalance of generalists relative to specialists by a di￿erential decrease in risk in
the latter occupation, and this interpretation is consistent with the above conclusions. In
addition, the ￿nding that more able physicians sort in narrower ￿elds is consistent with
the literature. For example, Kiker and Zeh (1998) report that ‘It is generally expected
that physicians with greater academic ability opt for the more technical specialties over
primary care.’
Growth in Specialization
The model also provides an explanation for the recent growth in the number of medical
specialties. The recognition of medical specialties started in the late 1920’s in an attempt
to standardize curriculum, training, and quali￿cation. The number of sub-specialties,
measured either by the number of sub-specialties with accredited programs or with cer-
ti￿cation of individual physicians, has grown from about 30 in the early 1970’s to more
than 100 in the late 1990’s (Donini-Lenho￿, 2000). The appropriate mix of generalist and
specialist has been an ongoing topic of debate (Barondess, 2000). Some see specializa-
tion as the result of technological and scienti￿c advances and we do not deny that such
trends play a role.16 We argue that in addition to this fragmentation force, the issue of
moral hazard may have also played a role in the growth in specialization. The model
shows that sub-specialties that cover domains where performance can be assessed more
accurately have an incentive to branch out. For example, the sample size e￿ect suggests
16The growth in sup-specialization in the 90’s has occurred in a period where the total number of
residents was not increasing (Brotherton et al. 2002), ruling out the hypothesis that scale alone is driving
specialization.
22that moral hazard might be reduced in more specialized ￿elds where physicians repeat
the same procedures.
The view presented in this work is consistent with the observation that the growth in
specialization is largely decentralized and has been supply-driven. For example, Martini
(1993) argues that \the system responds more promptly to professionals’ interests and
institutionals’ service needs" than to \the health need of the population". Some have even
argued that the proliferation of specialties di￿uses responsibility for clinical care over time
and over multiple health disorders which is fully consistent with the view presented in
our analysis. While generalists are exposed to a common risk associated with unknown
ailments, specialists are held responsible only for speci￿c disorders.
A prediction speci￿c to our analysis is that one would expect to observe more sub-
specialization when there is more heterogeneity in risk within the set of disorders that
belong to a given medical ￿eld. In addition, the branching out should be initiated by
low risk sub-specialties. This prediction has obvious implications in the context of the
malpractice debate. Given that malpractice premia are specialty dependent, those physi-
cians working in low-risk specialties do not want to pool risk with high-risk specialties.
We argue that this same force o￿ers a more general explanation for the trend toward
specialization.
Malpractice
Kessler et al. (2005) present evidence on the impact of malpractice liability on the
supply of physicians. They compared states that adopted legal reforms that limited mal-
practice liability to those that didn’t on trends in physician enrolment, distinguishing
specialties with di￿erent levels of risk. They considered a wide range of reform to mal-
practice laws between 1985 and 2001 that a￿ected variables such as the level of damage
awards, the possibility for punitive damage, among others. Using a di￿erence in di￿erence
approach, they found greater growth in physician supply in states that adopted reforms,
and a greater-than-average e￿ect on the supply of physicians in the majority of the high
risk specialties.
This evidence is consistent with our model but not de￿nitive. In fact, a decrease in
23malpractice liability non only decreases risk but also decreases the expected cost of mal-
practice. Even if physicians were risk-neutral, which would eliminate the force identi￿ed
in the model, one would expect that malpractice reforms should increase physician sup-
ply. Our model predicts that the same response should be observed even after holding the
expected cost of malpractice constant. Unfortunately, Kessler et al. did not distinguish
the impact of malpractice laws due to changes in expected cost and changes in risk. Using
a smaller sample from Arizona, Thornton (2000) holds expected cost constant and ￿nds
that malpractice risk has a negative impact on physician supply (a ￿nding consistent with
our analysis) but the e￿ect is not signi￿cant.
Even more convincingly, Kessler et al. (2005) showed that the legal reform had a
lower impact among physicians practicing in large organizations. Since the expected cost
of malpractice should be independent of the size of the organization, the reform should
have an impact on the relative supply of physicians only through a change in relative
risk. Because it is more di￿cult to self-insure risk in small organizations, the reform
should di￿erentially increase the attractiveness of small organizations, and this prediction
is consistent with the evidence presented in Kessler et al.
Policy Implications
Consumer advocacy groups, health insurers, and medical societies share interests in
the development of methods that permit to identify and reward better physicians.17 In
a review of physician clinical performance assessment, Landon et al. (2003b) argue that
\both patients and health care purchasers desire more e￿ective means of identifying ex-
cellent clinicians, and a number of organization have begun discussing and implementing
plans of assessing the performance of individual clinicians... Some professional specialty
societies have begun encouraging physicians to measure their performance by o￿ering in-
creased recognition to those who participate in voluntary performance assessment." The
possibility to reward physician performance is also receiving increasing attention as wide-
spread experimentation is yielding lessons on the impact of pay-for-performance (Armour
et al. 2001).18
17See Loeb (2004) for a historical review on the use of performance measurement in health care.
18Another approach to increase quality of care is to require medical specialties to administer re-
24The model suggests that policies geared toward the introduction of performance mea-
surement should take into account the sorting implications of unevenly changing moral
hazard risk across medical occupations. An increased emphasis on pay-for-performance,
through subsidies to invest in s for example, will change the relative importance of per-
formance incentives across medical occupations, and could increase the importance of
PAM, with possible distortions in the allocation of talent. Our model establishes a con-
nection between the debate on performance measurement in medicine and the debate on
the supply physicians across medical occupations, and suggests that in order to internal-
ize externalities across specialties, reforms that in￿uence moral hazard risks should be
implemented across-the-board instead of specialty-by-specialty.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents a model of sorting of physicians across medical occupations. Our
departing assumption is that it is more di￿cult to identify physicians’ performance in
occupations where scienti￿c fact and clinical evidence play a lesser role and where clinical
outcomes are uncertain and di￿cult to compare. The model sheds some light on the
possibility of di￿erential ine￿ciency across medical occupations, the debate on the relative
scarcity of talent across occupations, the growth in the number of sub-specialities, and the
impact of malpractice risk on career choice. To conclude, we discuss broader applications
of the model.
The main message of the model applies to other specialized labor markets. In fact,
there are many labor markets where workers have to commit to an occupation and where
the ability to measure performance di￿ers across occupations. An occupation where per-
formance cannot be measured precisely could be an occupation where there are no explicit
performance measures or more generally an occupation where it takes a long time before
individual e￿ort has an impact on organizational performance. This could be because
the occupation involves complex tasks, uncertain and changing environments, team work,
and other factors that make it di￿cult to disentangle the role played by di￿erent input
certi￿cation boards.
25factors of production and random productivity shocks. As a result, even evaluators who
have access to the same objective information (e.g. supervisors, peers, or experts) may
disagree about individual performance. Applications include the market for academics
(Courty and Marschke, 2008), or a ￿rm’s internal labor market with competing career
tracks. In these labor markets, our model establishes a relationship across occupations
between: (a) exposure to moral hazard risk, (b) the allocation of talent, (c) the use of
pay for performance incentives, and (d) productivity di￿erentials.
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Figure 1: Timeline  
Physician ρ chooses c(ρ) 
Specialty γ chooses s(γ) 
Physicians exert effort, 
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Pre-matching Investments Appendix: Proofs
For the sake of completeness, we present all the steps to derive the equilibrium.
Equilibrium De￿nition
We de￿ne the continuation payo￿s (in certainty equivalent units) in period two, con-
ditional on matching and investments as U2;P(b;c;s) and U2;S(b;c;s). Using the e￿ort
rule e(b1;c) from equation (1), simple computations give U2;P(b;c;s) = b0 + b1e(b1;c) ￿
C(e(b1;c)jc) ￿ r
2(sCe(e(b1;c)jc))2 for s 6= ; and U2;S(b;c;s) = ￿(e(b1;c)) ￿ b0 ￿ b1e(b1;c)
for c 6= ;.19 The equilibrium conditions can be formally stated as:










(2) Stability is satis￿ed if physician c such that ￿2;S(c) 6= ; does not want to deviate
from B(c) and ￿2;S(c) in stage two
B(c);￿P(c) 2 ArgMaxb;s6=; U2;P(b;c;s)
s:t: U2;S(b;c;s) ￿ u2;S(s)
and specialty s such that ￿2;P(s) 6= ; does not want to deviate from B(￿2;P(s))and ￿2;P(s)
B(￿2;P(s));￿2;P(s) 2 ArgMaxb;c6=; U2;S(b;c;s)
s:t: U2;P(b;c;s) ￿ u2;P(c) :
(3) In addition, worker ￿ is willing to participate in period one, ￿exp[￿r(u2;P(c(￿))￿
H(c(￿)j￿))] ￿ U0 and the same holds for specialty s, u2;S(s(￿)) ￿ K(s(￿)j￿)) ￿ U0;S.
(4) Rational expectations hold if u2;P(c) = U2;P(B(c);c;￿2;S(c)) and u2;S(s) = U2;S(B(￿2;P(s));￿2;S(s);s).
Since physicians and occupations can select the outside option in period one, we do
not have to reconsider this option in period two.
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof goes by contradiction. Assume (c;s) are matched and work under contract
b = (b0;b1) such that b1 6= b1(c). Stability implies that
U2;S(b;c;s) ￿ Maxb0 U2;S(b0;c;s)
s:t: U2;P(b0;c;s) ￿ u2;P(c)
The maximum computed under the restriction that the constraint binds is weakly domi-
nated by the maximum without this restriction.
U2;S(b;c;s) ￿ Maxb0 U2;S(b0;c;s)
s:t: U2;P(b0;c;s) = u2;P(c)




















19Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), p. 179.
30Plugging the above equality in the objective function and cancelling terms gives
















The maximization problem on the right hand side has a unique optimum as long as
C2
ee + CeCeee > 0 which holds under A1a. The optimum is achieved at b1(c). The above
inequality contradicts the assumption that b1 6= b1(c). QED
Restatement of the Period Two Matching Problem
















Assumption A1a is su￿cient to guarantee that there is a unique maximum. We rewrite











2;S(s) for any c;s
The ￿rst conditions say that any matched pair splits their joint surplus. The second
condition corresponds to the stability conditions that no physician or specialty would be
better o￿ in a di￿erent match.
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof proceeds in three steps.
Claim 1: W 2;SB
cs (c;s) > 0.




2rsce (￿eecec + rs2ce(cece ￿ ceee))
￿ee ￿ cee ￿ rs2(ceceee + c2
ee)
which is positive under A1.
Claim 2: In any equilibrium, there is PAM in (c;s) in period two.
The proof follows by contradiction. Assume c1 > c0 and s1 > s0 and pairs (c1;s0) and


















31which contradicts claim 1 stating that c and s are complement in W 2;SB.
Claim 3: In any equilibrium, there is PAM in (c;￿￿).
The proof again follows by contradiction. Assume c1 > c0 and ￿1 > ￿0 and pairs
(c0;￿0) and (c1;￿1) are matched. Two cases can be distinguished. The case s(￿1) < s(￿0)
leads to a contradiction with claim 2 stating that there is PAM in (c;s). Consider next
the possibility that s(￿1) > s(￿0). In period one, ￿0 does not want to mimic ￿1 and ￿1
does not want to mimic ￿0. This implies
u
2;S(s(￿0)) ￿ u
2;S(s(￿1)) + (K(s(￿1)j￿1) ￿ K(s(￿1)j￿0))
u
2;S(s(￿1)) ￿ u
2;S(s(￿0)) + (K(s(￿0)j￿0) ￿ K(s(￿0)j￿1))
Summing up these two inequalities gives
K(s(￿1)j￿1) ￿ K(s(￿0)j￿1) ￿ K(s(￿1)j￿0) ￿ K(s(￿0)j￿0)
which contradicts the fact that ￿ and s are complement in K.
To conclude, note that a similar proof as the one presented in claim 3 shows that there
is also PAM in (￿￿;s). Lemma 2 then follows by putting together PAM in (c;￿￿), (c;s),
and (￿￿;s). QED
Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 2 says that in there is PAM in (c;s) in any equilibrium. We ￿rst compute
the market return functions under period two equilibrium matching, then the equilibrium
investments in period one, and ￿nally show that the equilibrium investments in period
one are consistent with the market return functions.
Claim 1: Assume there is a continuum of types (c;s) in period two. There exists
a unique equilibrium (up to constants u2;P(c1) and u2;S(s1)) and it satis￿es PAM. The

























and u2;P(c1) + u2;S(s1) = W 2;SB(c1;s1).
Lemma 2 shows that PAM is the only candidate equilibrium. To show existence, we
￿rst show that the above payo￿ functions satisfy stability. Consider the possibility that



























32Therefore, physician c does not deviate. The same argument applies to specialty s.
To show uniqueness, note that in period two, physician c has to prefer ￿2;P(c) over
any other specialty, implying u2;P
c (c) = W 2;SB
c (c;￿2;S(c)). Similarly, we have u2;S
s (s) =
W 2;SB
s (￿2;P(s);s). These two di￿erential equations determine the functions u2;P and u2;S








1 = W 2;SB(c1;s1).
Claim 2: Equilibrium investments satisfy (4).
In period one, physician ￿ maximizes u2;P(c) ￿ H(cj￿). The ￿rst order condition to
the investment problem gives
u
2;P
c (c) ￿ Hc(cj￿) = 0:
In equilibrium, u2;P
c (c) = W 2;SB
c (c;￿2;S(c)) and after replacement, we obtain the ￿rst
equation in (4). The second equation can be similarly obtained by solving the specialty’s
investment problem. The second order condition to investment problems are satis￿ed if
(Hcc ￿ W 2
cc)(Kss ￿ W 2;SB
ss ) > W 2;SB
sc which holds under A2b.
Under A2, there exists a unique solution (c;s) to the system
(





Therefore, the functions (c(￿);s(￿)) are uniquely determined by (4).
Claim 3: Participation holds as long as ￿exp[￿r(u2;P(c1)￿H(c(￿1)j￿1))] ￿ U0;P and
u2;S(s1) ￿ K(s(￿1)j￿1)) ￿ U0;S.
Type ￿0 participates in period one if u2;P(c1) is such that ￿exp[￿r(u2;P(c1)￿H(c(￿1)j￿1))] ￿
U0;P. Types ￿ > ￿0 also participates because expected period one utility is increasing in ￿.
Similarly, ￿1 participates in period if u2;S(s1) is such that u2;S(s1) ￿ K(s(￿1)j￿1)) ￿ U0;S
and higher types also participates because period one utility is increasing in ￿.
Claim 4: Monotonicity of investment rules.
The ￿nal step is to check that period two matching de￿ned by (3) is consistent with the
investment rules de￿ned by (4). This will be the case if c(￿) and s(￿), are monotonously
decreasing in type. To show that this is the case, rewrite (4) as a function of ￿. PAM in
period one implies that ￿ is matched with a physician denoted ￿1;P(￿) such that
F(￿
1;P(￿)) = G(￿)




Replacing these expressions in (4) gives
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Since ￿1;P > 0, A2 is a su￿cient condition for monotonicity, c￿ < 0 and s￿ < 0. To
conclude, note that monotonicity of the investment rules implies that there is a continuum
of types (c;s) in period two and matching takes place according to (3). QED
Proof of Proposition 2
Given that pair (￿;￿) is matched together, the social planner sets the investments to
maximize the period one joint surplus W 2;SB(c;s) ￿ H(cj￿) ￿ K(sj￿). The information
constrained period one surplus of pair (￿;￿) measured in certainty equivalent units is
W
1(￿;￿) = Maxc;sfW
2;SB(c;s) ￿ H(cj￿) ￿ K(sj￿)g:
The social planner selects a matching rule in period one that maximizes the joint surplus
W 1(￿;￿). Since ￿ and ￿ are complement in the function W 1(￿;￿), PAM in (￿;￿) is e￿-
cient. The investment rules that maximize W 2;SB(c;s)￿H(cj￿)￿K(sj￿) under PAM are
monotonic in (￿;￿) and correspond to the equilibrium investment rules. The constrained
Pareto e￿cient allocation is identical to the equilibrium allocation. QED
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